Another superb story from Ghaith Abdul-Ahad about the Sunni militias (“concerned citizens”) who have been the linchpin of American tactical success in Iraq.
A senior Sunni sheikh, whose tribe is joining the new alliance with the Americans against al-Qaida, told me in Beirut that it was a simple equation for him. “It’s just a way to get arms, and to be a legalised security force to be able to stand against Shia militias and to prevent the Iraqi army and police from entering their areas,” he said.
“The Americans lost hope with an Iraqi government that is both sectarian and dominated by militias, so they are paying for locals to fight al-Qaida. It will create a series of warlords.
“It’s like someone who brought cats to fight rats, found himself with too many cats and brought dogs to fight the cats. Now they need elephants.”
…
The Americans pay him $400 (£200) a month for each fighter he provides, he said, and he had 600 registered. His men are awed by his courage, his piety and his neurotic rages.
Like many other insurgent groups, the Islamic Army had an uneasy alliance with al-Qaida. On one hand they needed financial support; on the other, al-Qaida became a burden, bringing upon the Sunnis the wrath of Shia militias and death squads who started an organised campaign of sectarian cleansing against the Sunnis in retaliation against al-Qaida’s mass killing of Shia.
“We lost our area,” Abu Abed said. “It became a battle zone between al-Qaeda and the Shia militias.”
So when a prominent Iraqi Sunni politician who had lived in the US returned to Iraq last year and started direct talks between the Islamic Army commanders from his tribe and the Americans, Abu Abed was prepared to listen. “A year ago we reached the decision that we needed to fight al-Qaida,” he said. “I knew I couldn’t fight them face to face – they had more men and weapons. So I started gathering intelligence on their commanders. I knew them all very well.”
The turning point came last year, when al-Qaida declared the establishment of the Islamic State of Iraq and attempted to impose itself on other insurgent groups. In one instance in west Baghdad, they demanded 25% of all the loot from other insurgent groups’ operations. The Islamic Army refused to pay and direct confrontations ensued.
“The bodies piled up in the streets,” Abu Abed said. “Most of the people had to leave the area and flee.”
The Hajji and his men used the same techniques they mastered as insurgents against their former allies. Sitting on a big sofa in his office, he recounted the events. “When we decided to attack we started with assassinations. We killed six [al-Qaida] commanders in the first week of fighting,” he said. “We would drive in unmarked cars, shoot a commander dead and then flee. At first, no one knew who was killing them.”
Soon an open war started. Of the hundreds who pledged to fight al-Qaida, only 13 actually stuck with Abu Abed. These days, almost all his followers claim to have been one of the 13. “When the Americans intervened, we went out with them on missions, leading them to the Qaida fighters,” he said.
…
After we had settled again in his office, Abu Abed told me of his grand dreams. “Ameriya is just the beginning. After we finish with al-Qaida here, we will turn toward our main enemy, the Shia militias. I will liberate Jihad [a Sunni area next to Ameriya taken over by the Mahdi army] then Saidiya and the whole of west Baghdad.”
…
Hours later the Ameriya Knights were on the streets again. There were rumours that Iraq’s Sunni vice-president, Tariq al-Hashemi, was visiting Ameriya for the first time in two years. As we approached the mosque where he was believed to be praying, the street was blocked by his guards.
“Open the road for the Ameriya Knights,” yelled one of Abu Abed’s men.
“I can’t, I don’t have orders,” replied a gunman. “Do you know who I am? I am the commander of Ameriya,” Abu Abed screamed at the vice-president’s commander of guards. “Who are you? Did you dare to show your faces here before I kicked al-Qaida out? Even the Americans with their tanks couldn’t come before I liberated Ameriya.” Bakr pointed his gun at the entourage. Guns were cocked on all sides.
“Abu Abed, we all know who you are, but this is the vice-president of Iraq.”
“This is Ameriya, not Iraq! Here I rule, I am the commander, I can make sure that you won’t show your faces here!“
“We are all Sunni brothers. The Shia militias will be happy to see us fighting; we have the same enemy,” said the man.
“You are trying to claim my victory. I will show you!” Abu Abed pushed the officer and went back to his car.
The fragmentation of Iraq was going on before General Petraeus, the surge, or any fancy new COIN strategies were implemented. This story could just as well have taken place in Kirkuk in 2004. It just feels a bit odd to be helping it occur, knowing that it is diametrically opposed to our broader strategic goal of a unified Iraqi nation under a single ruling authority.
Very much agree. And what is scary is that they seem to want to export this madness to Pakistan.
Well, let’s be clear – this ‘madness’ is already taking place in Pakistan, under the auspices of the Pakistani military. Their counterinsurgency in Baluchistan runs along quite similar lines.
“…knowing that it is diametrically opposed to our broader strategic goal of a unified Iraqi nation under a single ruling authority.”
Assuming that that was the goal.
I recall reading something close to a year ago; a reporter said that some government sources were predicting a change in administration policy. The idea was that the last few years had strengthened Shiite forces in the Middle East (Iran, the new government of Iraq, Hezbollah, etc.). So the administration was going to shift ‘pro-Sunni’, and attempt to counter Shiite forces. That’s what seems to have happened – this stuff, and a racheting up of anti-Iranian propaganda, including focusing blame for the guerrilla war in Iraq on ‘Al Quaida’ and ‘Iranian infiltrators’. Sunni guerrillas are now Our Friends, I guess.
I’d agree with to an extent, except one should not ignore the internal dynamics within Iraq, which are much more important than American shifts in strategy.
The U.S. has belatedly realized Iran’s strength and is moving to backstop its Sunni allies around the region as well as bring them into alignment against Tehran. The Annapolis conference is at least as much about doing this as it is about Israel/Palestine. However, most U.S. moves in Iraq remain tactical. SCIRI/ISCI is still America’s most valuable ally in Iraq and will remain so. The varied Sunni awakenings and CLCs are nowhere near as organized, as unified, nor as well-entrenched as are their Shi’i enemies in the new Iraq. Whether the Sunnis can unite is doubtful, even after AQI has been conclusively disposed of, and the U.S. is not the one who can mold them into a genuinely effective counterweight to the Shi’i religious parties or Iran.